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In “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Edmund Gettier attacked the thesis that S 
knows that P iff P is true, S believes that P, and S is justified in believing that P, to 
sustain that someone can have a true justified belief without knowing that belief. He 
made that by creating two counter-examples to that thesis. In this article, I will try to 
show that Gettier’s arguments are based in a weak account of justification, and that such 
a weak view cannot talk about someone knowing something. I begin by presenting his 
counter-examples, and then I show they do not work.
Gettier’s First Counter-Example
Smith  and  Jones  applied  for  a  job,  and  Smith  has  strong  evidence  for  this 
conjunctive proposition: (d) “Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten 
coins in his pocket”. This entails that (e) “the man who will get the job has ten coins in 
his  pocket”.  If  there is  strong evidence for (d) – if (d) is justified – there is strong 
evidence for (e), because (e) is deduced from (d) and (d) is based in strong evidence. 
Gettier also said that such strong evidence might be something like the president of the 
company had assured Smith about Jones getting the job and like the fact of Smith had 
counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. The main point is now: if in fact 
Smith, and not Jones, will get the job, and he also has ten coins in his pocket, so (e) is 
true, Smith believes that (e), and Smith is justified in believing that (e), although he 
does not know (e), because the base from where he inferred (e) is false. Such a base, (d), 
is false because Jones is not the man who will get the job. The conclusion Gettier arose 
from that was that from the facts that (e) is true, Smith believes that (e), and Smith is 
justified in believing that (e), we cannot conclude that Smith knows (e).
Gettier’s Second Counter-Example
Smith has strong evidence for the proposition (f)  “John owns a  Ford”.  Such 
strong evidence might be something like Jones had gave Smith a ride in a Ford today 
and the fact that Jones always in the past had a Ford. (f) entails the proposition (h)  
“Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona”, even without Smith knowing 
where Brown is located; what, in the example, he does not know. Again, if there is 
strong evidence for (f) – if (f) is justified – there is strong evidence for (h), because (h) 
is deduced from (f) and (f) is based in strong evidence. Then, Gettier asks us to imagine 
that Brown is really in Barcelona, and that Jones had sold his car, and just had rented 
that Ford. In this case, for Gettier: (h) is true, Smith believes that (h), Smith is justified 
in believing that (h), and even so Smith does not know (h), because the first simple 
proposition from (f) is false, and because Smith didn’t know the second one.
Strong and weak justifications: knowing and believing
I think Gettier’s counter-examples would fit only if we have a weak notion of 
justification. A weak notion of justification is that someone is justified that P if he/she 
has good reasons to believe that P, but those reasons do not make not-P impossible; 
whose  reasons  I  will  call  “weak  evidence”.  A strong  notion  of  justification  is  that 
someone has a justification for P, if such justification makes not-P impossible. I will call 
“strong evidence” the reasons given in a strong justification.
We could say that, in the first example, Smith does not have strong evidence to 
believe that Jones will get the job; after all, the president of the company saying so does 
not make impossible the truth of “it is not the case that Jones will get the job”. A strong 
evidence would be something like the signed papers contracting Jones: if the papers are 
signed, and if the rule is that just one person can get the job, it means Jones got the job. 
But if we say Jones will get the job only because the president said so, it does not make 
impossible the negation of “Jones will get the job”, although it is a good reason to think 
that he will. So, what the president told Smith is a good reason to Smith to think that 
Jones will get the job, but it is not a strong justification of it. Thus, if Smith has not a 
strong justification for both sentences in (d), and if (e) is deduced from (d), then Smith 
does not have a strong justification for (e). The second counter-example follows the 
same path. Smith is not strongly justified in believing that (f) “Jones has a Ford”; he 
would be if he had seen the papers of the ownership from the car in the name of Jones. 
The reasons given by Smith to justify that (f) do not make impossible not-(f);  what 
make them weak justifications.
My point is that a weak notion of justification cannot be given as a justification 
to know something. If I know something, I cannot be wrong in what I know. If I just 
believe something, I can be wrong, although I must have some good reasons to believe 
in what I believe. So, if I want to justify the assertion that I know something, and not 
merely believe it, I have to justify it with reasons to know it, and not with reasons to 
merely believe it. The only justification that would produce a reason to know something 
would be a justification that makes impossible the negation of my assertion, because if 
it is impossible that not-P, so I cannot be wrong when I say that P; so, if I know a reason 
that makes not-P impossible, I know that P.
Gettier,  in  his  examples,  always  takes  weak  evidences  as  reasons  to  know 
something.  And it  is  for  this  that  he always  finds  that  a  true justified belief  is  not 
sufficient for knowledge. He is right iff we use a weak concept of justification. If we use 
a strong one, Smith would not be justified in knowing that Jones will get the job and, 
hence, he won’t be justified in knowing that the man who will get the job has ten coins 
in his pocket. Thus, if it is true that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his  
pocket and that Smith believes it, if he has not a strong justification of it, it would not be 
an absurd to say that Smith does not know it and just believe it. In another way, if Smith 
is  strongly  justified  in  believing  that  the  man  who  will  get  the  job  is  Jones  –  for 
example, he had seen the contracting papers signed by the president in Jones’s mail – 
and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, so he is strongly justified in believing that the 
man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket; hence he knows that the man who 
will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, and he cannot be wrong.
Thus, what Gettier really shows us is that if we say that we know something 
only  based  in  weak  justifications,  it  will  lead  us  to  the  problem  explored  in  his 
examples.  What  I  tried  to  show  was  that  if  we  use  strong  justifications,  Gettier’s 
problems will not arise, and we can continuing thinking that S knows that P when P is 
true, S believes that P, and S is [strongly] justified in believing so.
